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The nature of the freedom to travel abroad as a substantive
constitutional right has perplexed United States' courts over the last
three decades. The validity of passport legislation and State De-
partment regulations have been challenged to no avail. Conse-
quently, the scope and limits of the right to travel internationally
have not yet been determined. In Haig v. Agee,' the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the President, acting through
the Secretary, has the authority to revoke a passport on the ground
that the holder's activities "are causing or are likely to cause serious
damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United
States."2 The result is an enhancement of the Secretary's ability to
curtail the citizen's constitutional right to travel abroad. Thus,
every American citizen must evaluate the reasons for which he
desires to travel in expectation of the possibility that such travel
might be barred. The approval of a passport, of course, will be
dependent on whether the State Department is satisfied that the
traveler will not cause any harm to the nation's national security or
foreign policy.3
Following a brief discussion of the importance of travel, this
Note will review the history of the use of passports and then ex-
plain why the need for judicial interpretation of the right to travel
arose. It follows with an examination of two landmark United
I. 453 U.S. 280 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Agee].
2. Id. at 281-82.
3. A portion of the State Department's oral argument is "particularly revealing":
Question: General McCree, supposing a person right now were to apply for a
passport to go to Salvador, and when asked the purpose of his journey, to say, to
denounce the United States policy in Salvador in supporting the juanta. And the
Secretary of State says, I just will not issue a passport for that purpose. Do you
think that he can consistently do that in the light of our previous cases?
Solicitor General McCree: I would say, yes, he can. Because we have to vest
these--the President of the United States and the Secretary of State working under
him are charged with conducting the foreign policy of the Nation, and the freedom
of speech that we enjoy domestically may be different from that that we can exer-
cise in this context.
Agee, 453 U.S. at 319 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In response to this testimony, Justice
Brennan stated "the reach of the Secretary's discretion is potentially staggering." Id.
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States Supreme Court decisions4 in which the Court determined the
basis upon which passports may be denied. These cases demon-
strate that the denial of a passport will not be upheld unless the
government can establish that it had formerly exercised the same
power in a consistent fashion. Neither arbitrary nor sporadic pass-
port refusals will withstand judicial review. This Note will further
demonstrate the significant departure of the Agee decision from
those precedent cases on which it was purportedly based.5 Instead
of relying on these prior decisions, the Court formulated a com-
pletely different standard for adjudging the validity of passport de-
nials. Finally, this Note will indicate that the Court's analysis was
inadequate in dealing with the delicate constitutional issues associ-
ated with one's right to travel. The Court essentially ignored the
fact that the government's revocation of a passport for the purpose
of suppressing free speech has a significant impact on the traveler's
first amendment rights. The solution to this problem is the imposi-
tion of first amendment standards of review in any situation in
which it is indicated that the passport holder's first amendment
rights might be restrained.
I. THE HAIG v AGEE SETTING
Phillip Agee, an American citizen, resided in West Germany.6
From 1957 to 1968, he was employed by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), wherein he held key positions in a division responsi-
ble for intelligence gathering in foreign countries.7 In 1974, Agee
called a press conference in London to announce his "campaign to
fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating."8 Subse-
quently, Agee traveled extensively to carry out this campaign.9 On
4. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kent]; Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Zemel].
5. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan expressed his belief that the Court's pur-
ported reliance on prior decisions was "fundamentally misplaced." Agee, 453 U.S. at 310
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 283.
7. Id.
8. The 1974 declaration stated in part:
Today, I announced a new campaign to fight the United States CIA wherever it is
operating. This campaign will have two main functions: First, to expose CIA of-
ficers and agents and to take measures necessary to drive them out of the countries
where they are operating; secondly, to seek within the United States to have the
CIA abolished.
Id. at 283 n.2.
9. Agee's travels included such countries as Mexico, England, Jamaica, France, Den-
mark, Cuba and Germany. Additionally, Agee wrote extensively during that period expos-
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December 23, 1979, the Secretary of State sent Agee a letter notify-
ing him that his passport had been revoked under the provisions of
section 51.70(b)(4) of the State Department passport regulations.' °
This provision provided for the revocation of one's passport if
one's "activities were causing or were likely to cause serious dam-
age to the national security or foreign policy of the United
States."''
Agee did not pursue his right to an administrative hearing, but
immediately filed suit against the Secretary.' 2 For purposes of a
summary judgment motion, Agee conceded the government's claim
that his "activities were causing or were likely to cause serious
damage to the national security and foreign policy."' 3 Agee put
forth four allegations. First, the regulation invoked by the Secre-
tary had not been authorized by Congress and was invalid.' 4 Sec-
ond, the regulation was impermissibly overbroad. 5 Third, the
revocation violated a fifth amendment liberty interest in the right to
travel and a first amendment right to criticize government poli-
cies.' 6 Fourth, the revocation violated the fifth amendment right to
procedural due process in that no prior hearing was provided. 7
The district court held that the regulation exceeded the statutory
authority granted to the Secretary.' 8 The court of appeals affirmed
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
This decision necessitates an in-depth look into the right to
travel. A discussion of the evolvement of passports, and ultimately,
passport regulations, will aid in an understanding of the right to
travel.
ing various CIA operations. Id. at 286. See generally P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA
DIARY (1975); DIRTY WORK: THE CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE (P. Agee & L. Wolf eds. 1978).
10. The notice states in part: "The Department's action is predicated upon a determina-
tion made by the Secretary under the provisions of 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) that your activi-
ties abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the
foreign policy of the United States." Agee, 453 U.S. at 286.
11. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1981).
12. Agee, 453 U.S. at 287. For purposes of satisfying due process requirements, the
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II. NECESSITY OF THE FREEDOM TO TRAVEL
The right to travel is indispensable in a democratic society.
Except for past crime, physical detention is not permitted in such a
society. 9 Also, freedom of mobility is often necessary to the earn-
ing of one's livelihood.2" Foreign journalists, lecturers and corre-
spondents are frequently required to travel. Scientists and scholars
derive substantial benefit from interchange with foreign colleagues.
Finally, a democratic society assures its citizens of a constitution-
ally protected "right to know."'"
It has also been the policy of the American government to en-
courage its citizens to engage with other nations on a social, polit-
ical and economic basis. As nations have become politically and
commercially more dependent upon one another and foreign policy
decisions have come to have greater impact upon the lives of our
citizens, the right to travel has become correspondingly more im-
portant. This right to travel has provided a means for the private
citizen or government official to obtain information vital to the
making of informed decisions. As Professor Chafee stated:
An American who has crossed the ocean is not obliged to form
his opinions about our foreign policy merely from what he is told
by officials of our government or by a few correspondents of
American newspapers. Moreover, his views are enriched by see-
ing how foreigners are trying to solve similar problems. In many
different ways direct contact with other countries contributes to
sounder decisions at home.
22
The General Assembly of the United Nations, moreover, has
included a provision for the right to travel in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights.23 The freedom to travel internationally
has undeniably assumed a position of great significance. As this
Note will demonstrate, a more stringent standard should be pro-
vided for determining when the right to travel abroad may be
restricted.
19. Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47, 49 (1956).
20. Id.
21. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 957 (1978).
22. Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 195-96
(1956).
23. G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). Article 13 of the Declaration
provides that "(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each State. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and return to his country."
4
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III. HISTORICAL NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
A. Judicial Recognition
Initially, it is helpful to discuss the origins of the right to travel
and its final development whereby judicial control became neces-
sary. English common law was based upon the assumption that no
man possessed the personal right to leave the King's realm without
permission.24 This concept evolved from the fact that the King
would otherwise be deprived of his subjects' military and feudal
services.25 This was changed by the Magna Carta in 1215 A.D.,
where it was asserted that every free man was allowed to leave the
realm during times of peace upon his own inclination.26 This de-
velopment was further propounded by Blackstone who wrote, "Per-
sonal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing
situation, in moving one's person to whatsoever places one's own
inclination may direct without imprisonment or restraint, unless by
due course of law."
27
Likewise, the right to travel in the United States or abroad has
never been judicially questioned, with the exception of some minor
reservations.28 As early as William v. Fears,29 it was stated that
"Undoubtedly the right to locomotion, the right to remove from
one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of per-
sonal liberty, supported by Constitutional provisions."30 Although
the Court in Fears was considering the freedom of interstate move-
ment, "it is difficult to see how, in principle, freedom to travel
outside the United States is any less an attribute of personal lib-
erty."'I The predominant view is that the right to travel abroad is
an aspect of liberty protected by the fifth amendment of the
24. Boudin, supra note 19, at 47.
25. Id. See also The Right To Travel Hearings on S. Res. 49 Be/ore the Subcommn on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 158
(1957).
26. Boudin, supra note 19, at 47.
27. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
28. "Persons confined in prison or released upon bond, pending trial or appeal, were an
exception to the general rule." Boudin, supra note 19, at 52.
29. 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
30. Id. at 274.
31. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F.Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952) [hereinafter cited as Bauer).
Later cases indicated that a distinction does exist between travel interstate and international
travel. In Cahfano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Califano] it
was stated that "[tihe constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified. By con-
trast the right of international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
Vol. 13
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Constitution.32
Passports traditionally were seldom required for travel
abroad." The passport was merely a diplomatic document in
which the issuing sovereign requested that other sovereigns would
extend aid and protection to the passport bearer. In 1941, Congress
enacted travel control legislation to cope with emergency situations
surrounding World War II. As a result, the passport became a re-
quirement for travel abroad.34 Subsequently, the travel provisions
were embodied as section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952,11 and were made applicable during any period of na-
tional emergency. 36 As a consequence, no American citizen could
leave the United States without a passport, the issuance of which
was dependent upon permission by the executive department
through the Secretary of State.37
Upon the enactment of section 215 of the 1952 Immigration
and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State's discretion to issue
passports became subject to judicial interpretation.38 Previously,
the 1856 statute, which gave the Secretary of State authority to is-
sue passports, was generally interpreted by the State Department to
vest absolute discretion in the Secretary.39 Since passports had not
been an essential element for travel, however, the Secretary's dis-
cretion could not have been considered a curtailment of a person's
constitutional rights.4° With the requirement of passports for travel
abroad, it became evident that the Secretary had at his disposal the
ability to prevent citizens from traveling.4' Consequently, those
persons whose right to travel was denied sought judicial relief.
42
The first judicial test of this discretionary power came in Bauer
32. Annot., 58 L.Ed. 2d 904, 908 (1978).
33. See generally 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-97 (1967);
Boudin, supra note 19, at 49.
34. See 6 Fed. Reg. 5821 (1941).
35. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 215, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1976)).
36. Under the 1952 statute, passports were required only during wartime or when the
President had declared a national emergency.
37. Comment, Judicial Review ofthe Right to Travel- 4 Proposal, 42 WASH. L. REV. 873,
875 (1967).
38. Id.
39. The Right To Travel Hearings on S, Res. 49 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 165 (1957).
40. Boudin, supra note 19, at 52-53.
41. Boudin, supra note 19, at 53.
42. Id.
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Y. Acheson .43 Bauer involved an action seeking a declaratory judg-
ment which would provide that the Secretary of State could not
revoke a passport on the ground that its holder's activities are con-
trary to the best interests of the United States. The court held that
"personal liberty includes the freedom to travel outside the United
States and while this freedom is subject to reasonable regulation
and control in the interest of public welfare, the fifth amendment
requires due process of law and equal protection of the laws in the
exercise of that control."" The court added that the regulation of
passports could not be administered arbitrarily or capriciously.45
On June 23, 1955, in Shachiman v. Dulles,46 the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals rendered the first decision concerning the
nature and sufficiency of State Department regulations for denying
passports.47 As a result, the relationship between a person's natural
right to travel and the restrictions which may be imposed upon that
right was clarified.48 In that case, Max Shachtman had been denied
a passport on the basis of his affiliation with the Independent So-
cialist League,49 which had been placed on the Attorney General's
subversive list. Shachtman argued that this affiliation was a legally
insufficient basis for the denial of his passport.50 In its decision, the
court reasoned that a passport was no longer merely a political doc-
ument, but had become an essential prerequisite for lawful depar-
ture from the United States.5 Thus, the court held that due process
is violated where "the listing of the League by the Attorney Gen-
eral as subversive was the only reason for the Secretary's refusal to
issue the passport."52 The court also provided that the deprivation
of such a liberty must have a reasonable relation to the conduct of
43. Bauer, 106 F.Supp. at 445.
44. Id. at 450.
45. Id. at 452.
46. 255 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cit. 1955) [hereinafter cited as Shachtman].
47. The plaintiff in Bauer sought a hearing, not a passport.
48. Shachtman did not deny that the Secretary of State possessed some discretion in
withholding passports. The argument advanced was that the Secretary either had not exer-
cised it or had done so arbitrarily by accepting the Attorney General's list as conclusive.
Shachtman, 255 F.2d at 940.
49. Exec. Order No. 10450, 3 C.F.R. 72 (Supp. 1953), required the Attorney General to
furnish executive department heads with a list of organizations. The categories of organiza-
tions therein established are Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, those having a policy of advo-
cating the use of force to deprive others of constitutional rights, and those having a policy of
seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
Members of such organizations were denied passports.
50. Shachtman, 225 F.2d at 940.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 943.
Vol. 13
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foreign affairs." Again, the Shachtman court did not deny that the
Secretary possessed some discretion as to passport refusals but re-
jected the exercise of this discretion in an arbitrary manner. This
discretion results, according to the court, from the executive re-
sponsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, and presumably an
individual's right to travel might be restrained.
Thus the courts had made it clear that: (1) the Secretary of
State does possess discretionary power to withhold passports;
(2) the exercise of that discretion could not be arbitrary or capri-
cious; (3) the discretion must have some relation to the conduct of
foreign affairs; and, (4) the right to travel is a concept of liberty
included within the fifth amendment, whereby any restraint must
be within the due process clause.
B. The Emergence of a Test
Before entering a complete analysis of the Agee opinion, a
short discussion of two prior decisions is necessary. Both cases are
landmark decisions in the area of passport regulation, and in each
case the Supreme Court of the United States fashioned the proper
approach for determining whether the Department of State had
been delegated the authority to deny a passport under the statute.54
It will later be shown that the Agee Court departed from prior law,
resulting in a less-rigid standard for resolving when a passport may
be denied.
In Kent v. Dulles," decided in 1958, two applicants were de-
nied passports under section 51.135 of the regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of State on the grounds that: (1) they were Com-
munists and (2) they had maintained "a consistent and prolonged
adherence to the Communist Party line."56 The objective of this
regulation was to promote the national interest by assuring that
persons who support the world Communist movement could not,
through the use of American passports, further that movement.57
53. Id.
54. Agee, 453 U.S. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Kent, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
56. Id. at 1.17.
57. 22 C.F.R. § 51.135 provides in part:
In order to promote the national interest by assuring that persons who support the
World Communist movement of which the Communist Party is an integral unit
may not, through use of United States passports, further the purposes of that move-
ment, no passport, except one limited for direct and immediate return to the United
States, shall be issued to: (a) Persons who are members of the Communist
Party. ...
8
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The Court was not concerned with the extent to which travel
could be curtailed, but to what extent Congress had authorized its
curtailment. 8 The difficulty was that although the 1856 Passport
Act had expressed the power over the issuance of passports in
broad terms, the Secretary of State had exercised such power on a
limited basis.59 Upon examination of the history of passport deni-
als, the Court concluded that there were two categories. First, the
Secretary of State could deny a passport on the basis of the appli-
cant's allegiance to the United States, for Congress had provided
that "no passport shall be granted or verified for any other persons
than those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United
States."'60 Second, passports could be refused on the grounds that
the applicant was participating in illegal conduct, attempting to
avoid prosecution, promoting passport frauds, or engaging in con-
duct which would violate the laws of the United States.61 The
grounds for refusal asserted in Kent did not relate to either alle-
giance or unlawful conduct.62 There existed only inconsistent and
scattered rulings of passport refusals with respect to Communists.63
Therefore, the Court was:
hesitant to impute to Congress when in 1952 it made a passport
necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion
of the Secretary of State, a purpose to give him unbridled discre-
tion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen for any sub-
stantial reason he may choose.64
Zemel v. Kent, 65 decided in 1965, concerned the validity of reg-
ulations devised by the Secretary of State providing for restrictions
on travel to Cuba. The Court held that the Secretary was author-
ized to invoke area restrictions to prevent citizens from traveling to
those areas.66 The decision rested upon the fact that the Executive
(b) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the Com-
munist Party, who engage in activities which support the Communist
movement ...
(c) Persons as to whom there is reason to believe, on the balance of all the
evidence, that they are going abroad to engage in activities which will advance
the Communist movement.
Id. at 117-18 n.l.




62. Id. at 128.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Zemel, 381 U.S. at I.
66. Id. at 7.
Vol. 13
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had regularly imposed area restrictions, both in times of war and
peace.67
When these two cases are read together, there emerges a test to
determine the validity of passport regulations.68 In both cases, the
Court observed that the right to travel abroad is an important right
included within the liberty guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
Any infringement upon that liberty must be pursuant to the law-
making function of Congress.69 Any delegation to the executive
branch which curtails that liberty must be construed narrowly.
70
Therefore, if the legislative branch has not explicitly authorized the
revocations, implicit authorization must rest upon a substantial and
consistent administrative practice which is sufficient to warrant the
conclusion that it has been approved by Congress.7' An analysis of
the Agee decision is necessary at this point to demonstrate that the
Court has changed its position with respect to the grounds required
for the denial of passports.
IV. THE DECISION OF THE COURT
The first assumption in Agee was the Court's belief that the
judiciary must adhere to a consistent administrative construction of
the statute absent a compelling indication that such construction is
wrong.72 A strict statutory construction is especially required
where matters of foreign policy and national security are con-
cerned.73 In such matters, "congressional silence was not to be
equated with congressional disapproval. 74 In other words, the
Court placed limitations upon its right to intervene in foreign
policy.
75
Upon this foundation, the Court reviewed the history of execu-
tive construction of the statute. As a result of "an unbroken line of
67. Id. at 8-10.
68. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan determined that the Court had previously
developed the proper approach for ascertaining the validity of passport regulations. He con-
tinued: "The analysis is hardly confusing, and I expect that had the Court faithfully applied
it, today's judgment would affirm the decision below." Agee, 453 U.S. at 312 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
69. Kent, 357 U.S. at 125; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14.
70. Kent, 357 U.S. at 129.
71. Agee, 453 U.S. at 312-14.
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Executive Orders,76 regulations, 77 instructions to consular offi-
cials, 78 and notices to passport holders, 79 the President and the De-
partment of State left no doubt that likelihood of damage to
national security or foreign policy of the United States was the sin-
gle most important criterion in passport decisions." 0 This history,
the Court concluded, demonstrated congressional recognition of
the executive authority to withhold or revoke passports on such
grounds, and the regulation was therefore valid.
An even more significant decision of the Court concerns the
type of executive action pertaining to the regulations themselves
which is necessary to mandate recognition by the Legislature."'
Agee had contended that "the only way the Executive can establish
implicit congressional approval is by proof of longstanding and
consistent enforcement of the claimed power."8 2 In other words, it
must be shown that many passports had previously been revoked
on grounds of national security and foreign policy. The Court dis-
missed this argument by specifying that Agee's contention is en-
tirely irrelevant if the Executive encountered few instances in which
such a power could be invoked.83 Such was the case here, in light
of the fact that the government cited only six cases of revocation
related to the regulation challenged at bar. 4 Thus, the Court held
that:
The Secretary has construed and applied the regulations consist-
ently, and it would be anomalous to fault the Government be-
cause there were so few occasions to exercise the announced
policy and practice. Although a pattern of actual enforcement is
one indicator of Executive policy, it suffices that the Executive
has "openly asserted" the power at issue.85
76. See Exec. Order No. 4800 (1928); Exec. Order No. 5860 (1932); Exec. Order No.
7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 681 (1935).
77. See 6 Fed. Reg. 5821, 6069-70, 6349 (1941); 17 Fed. Reg. 8013 (1952); 21 Fed. Reg.
336 (1956); 22 C.F.R. § 51.136 (1958).
78. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, No. 7.21 ABSTRACT OF PASSPORT LAWS AND
PRECEDENTS, PASSPORT OFFICE INSTRUCTIONS (Nov. 1, 1955).
79. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INFORMATION FOR BEARERS OF PASSPORTS (1955). The
Court in Agee relied on the editions published between 1948 and 1955.
80. Agee, 453 U.S. at 298.
81. It must be kept in mind that in previous decisions, the revocation of a passport had
been upheld only if such exercise had been based upon a consistent administrative practice.
See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
82. Agee, 453 U.S. at 301.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 317 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 303.
Vol. 13
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The Court also rejected the former proposition that illegal conduct
and lack of allegiance were the only grounds upon which passports
could be denied.
Finally, the Court rejected Agee's attack on constitutional
grounds.86 Agee had also argued that "(1) the revocation of his
passport impermissibly burdens his freedom to travel, and (2) that
the action was intended to penalize his exercise of free speech and
deter his criticism of government policies and practices."87 The
Court observed that although the revocation of a passport necessar-
ily curtails travel, "the freedom to travel abroad with a letter of
introduction in the form of a passport issued by the sovereign is
subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations,
as such, it is subject to reasonable government regulation."88
Moreover, the Court made it clear that the freedom to travel
outside the United States was distinguishable from the freedom to
travel interstate.89 Furthermore, the Court severely questioned
whether or not the first amendment protection extended beyond
our national boundaries.9" Agee's disclosures had the obvious ef-
fect of obstructing government intelligence operations. This activ-
ity, the Court declared, "is clearly not protected by the
Constitution."9'
The resultant interpretation of this case presents a threefold
problem. First, the Court misinterpreted the relationship between
passport legislation and the right to travel. Second, the decision
was purportedly based on the Zemel and Kent decisions, but when
closely scrutinized, the Agee decision constitutes a departure from
those cases. Third, the Agee Court did not satisfactorily provide a
basis upon which the constitutional validity of passports may be
denied. The following analysis will attempt to expose the discrep-
ancies associated with Agee.
V. PROBLEMS WITHIN THE AGEE ANALYSIS
A. Misinterpretation of Past Legislation
One major problem within the analysis of theAgee decision is
that the Court, upon improper grounds, came to the conclusion that




90. Id. at 308.
91. Id. at 309.
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Congress had adopted an administrative interpretation that the
right to travel may be based on national security or foreign policy
grounds. Unfortunately, the Court fails to acknowledge the fact
that the greater portion of passport regulations had been devised
when passports were not required for international travel.92 In-
deed, the average foreign traveler never bothered to apply for a
passport.93 Passports were not a requirement for travel, but were
merely utilized to aid and facilitate travel. Thus, until 1941, any
regulation promulgated in relation to passports to protect the na-
tional interest could hardly be considered an infringement upon
one's constitutional right to travel.9 4 Within this context, it would
seem illogical to assume that over the years, Congress had acqui-
esced in an administrative policy to regulate travel upon the as-
serted grounds when the executive department possessed no such
power.
A brief analysis of prior legislation will indicate that Congress
never intended to authorize the Secretary of State to promulgate
and enforce the regulations under attack in the Agee case. First,
since passports were not necessary for lawful travel abroad, the en-
actment by Congress of the first Passport Act in 1856 was not in-
tended to, and did not, affect the right to travel.95 Prior to the act,
various federal, state and local officials and public notaries had un-
dertaken to issue passports.96 This resulted in numerous instances
92. Brief for Respondent at 63, Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Respondent]; Boudin, supra note 19, at 47; Comment, Passport Refusals/or Political
Reasons, Constitutional Issues and Judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952); Comment, The
Passport Puzzle, 23 CHI. L. REV. 260 (1956); Comment, supra note 37, at 873.
93. 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 33, at 195. See also Ehrlich, Passports, 19 STAN. L.
REV. 129, 129 (1966).
94. In 1941, Congress enacted an amended version of the Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81,
40 Stat. 554. The new statute, Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252, provided in part as
follows:
When the United States is at war or during the existence of a national emergency
proclaimed by the President on May 27, 1941. . . and the President shall find that
the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions in addi-
tion to those provided otherwise than by this Act be imposed upon the departure of
persons from and their entry into the United States. . . . After such proclamation
• . . it shall. . . be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or
enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport ....
In 1952, Congress substantially re-enacted this act with section 215 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 190 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1976). As a
practical matter, one could lawfully leave and enter the United States without a passport,
except during wartime. However, travel without a passport would have been severely lim-
ited, due to passport requirements of other countries.
95. Boudin, supra note 19, at 52. See also Brief for Respondent, supra note 92, at 63.
96. 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 33, at 196.
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of passport fraud and deceit. To alleviate this problem, the Legisla-
ture enacted the statute with the intended purpose of centralizing
the issuance of passports within the executive department. 97 Noth-
ing in the legislative history of the 1856 statute suggests that the
Secretary of State had the power either to set up substantive catego-
ries of ineligibility or deny passports for the purpose of national
security and foreign policy. 98 In fact, the only power that arguably
was conferred upon the Secretary of State was some discretion in
elaborating a procedure for issuing passports with respect to the
citizenship of the applicant. 99
The preceding discussion also applies to the 1926 Passport Act
and its amendment in 1978.' TheAgee Court, relying on Zemel,
recognized that "congressional acquiescence may sometimes be
found from nothing more than silence in the face of an administra-
tive policy."10' The Court went on to say that Congress, although
confronted with the regulations at issue for nearly twenty-two
years, enacted new legislation making it unlawful to travel without
a passport, even during peacetime.
0 2
The Agee Court, however, seems to misinterpret the congres-
sional intent surrounding the passport statutes. First, the 1926
Passport Act was merely a re-enactment of the 1856 statute.'0 3 The
committee hearings conducted at the time indicated that nothing in
the provisions of the 1856 Act was to be changed."° The 1926
measure contained revisions aimed primarily at facilitating travel
by enlarging the number of American diplomats who could issue
passports.'0 5 When Congress amended the existing statute in 1978,
its purpose again was the facilitation of travel."° In fact, the his-
97. Agee, 453 U.S. at 294.
98. Brief for Respondent, supra note 92, at 64-65.
99. See Boudin, supra note 19, at 52-55.
100. The Court conceded that the 1926 Amendment worked no major changes in the
1856 statute. The Court's position with respect to the original 1856 statute was that the stat-
ute had implicitly delegated to the executive department the power to deny passports on
national security and foreign policy grounds. Agee, 453 U.S. at 298 & n.38.
101. Id. at 300.
102. Id.
103. Id. See 67 CONG. REC. 11705 (1926); Validity of Passports: Hearings on H.R. 11947
Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
104. Validity of Passports: Hearings on H. 11947 Before the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 11 (1926).
105. Agee, 453 U.S. at 297 n.38.
106. Brief for Respondent, supra note 92, at 87; 124 CONG. REC. 4689 (daily ed. May 31,
1978); S. REP. No. 1535, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 2478; S. REP. No. 842, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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tory surrounding the 1978 amendment demonstrated the intent of
Congress to abolish the existing statutory bases for travel controls
contained in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.'07 The
1978 amendment provided that:
unless authorized by law, a passport may not be designated as
restricted for travel to or for use in any country other than a
country with which the United States is at war, where armed
hostilities are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to
the public health or the physical safety of United States
citizens. 
10 8
Yet, the Court came to the conclusion that because Congress failed
to limit within the amendment the broad rule-making authority
contained in the earlier act, the Legislature necessarily succumbed
to the longstanding view that the Executive had the power to regu-
late passports for purposes of national security and foreign
policy 109
B. The Departure from Zemel and Kent
A second problem with the Court's decision is that it is not
entirely clear that Kent and Zemel are distinguishable from
Agee. ° The dissent argued that the Court disavowed many as-
pects of the prior decisions while purporting to rely on them.I"
There was no dispute in Agee that the 1926 Passport Act did not
expressly authorize the revocation of Agee's passport. 2  Under
these circumstances, Kent made it clear that an "administrative
practice sufficiently substantial and consistent" with regard to the
regulation was required to warrant implicit congressional ap-
proval.1 1 3 Justice Douglas, for the majority in Kent, emphasized
the lack of prior restraints on travel to support the position that
Congress had not implicitly authorized the administration to deny
passports on the basis that the applicant was Communist." 4
This technique for adjudging the validity of passport denials
107. Brief for Respondent, supra note 92, at 87, 92.
108. 22 U.S.C. § 21 la (Supp. 1980).
109. Agee, 453 U.S. at 301.
110. Both cases concern the validity of passport regulations promulgated by the State
Department. Also, the purpose of § 51.35 in Kent and § 51.70(b)(4) inAgee was to protect
the national security or foreign policy of the United States.
111. Agee, 453 U.S. at 310.
112. Id. at 313.
113. Kent, 357 U.S. at 125.
114. Id. at 128.
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was reaffirmed in Zemel." 5 In upholding the travel restriction to
Cuba, the Court based its opinion on the historical pattern of State
Department restrictions on travel to various areas. Chief Justice
Warren stated that there had been a practice of imposing area re-
strictions both before and after the 1926 Congressional Passport
Act. 116 Since this practice had not been disapproved by the Legis-
lature in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, he con-
cluded that Congress intended in 1926 to maintain in the Executive
the authority to make such restrictions. 117
Thus in both Kent and Zemel, the Court provided that pass-
port refusals could not be upheld unless such refusals had been ex-
ercised consistently in the past. The Agee Court, however,
markedly changed this test of approval. Essentially, the Court no
longer required that the administrative practice be demonstrated.
The requirement now asserted is that there merely be a longstand-
ing Executive policy. "8 This requirement is hardly the equivalent
of the test established in Kent which stated:
Under the 1926 Act and its predecessor a large body of prece-
dents grew up which repeat over and again that the issuance of
passports is "a discretionary act" on the part of the Secretary of
State. The scholars, the courts, the Chief Executive, and the At-
torneys General, all so said. This long-continued executive con-
struction should be enough, it is said, to warrant the inference
that Congress had adopted it. . . .But the key to that problem,
as we shall see, is in the manner in which the Secretary's discre-
tion was exercised, not in the bare fact that he had discretion." 9
Apparently, the Supreme Court today is more willing to infer con-
gressional consent, at least in the area of travel control.
Another aspect of the Kent decision which this Court all but
renounced is that major differences exist between those travel con-
trols exercised in times of war and national emergency, and those
exercised in times of peace. The Court in Kent refused to "equate
the problem of statutory construction during peacetime with
problems that may arise under the war power."' 120 The Agee Court
disregarded the Kent analysis and relied on numerous travel re-
strictions imposed in times of international tension and turbulence
115. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 12.
116. Id. at 8-11.
117. Id. at 12.
118. Agee, 453 U.S. at 301.
119. Kent, 357 U.S. at 124-25.
120. Id. at 128.
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in reaching its decision.' 2' Yet, during times of war, our national
security becomes more vulnerable to espionage and other subver-
sive activities. Likewise, the courts throughout history have
deemed this so and acknowledged the fact that the government can
assert greater control in order to protect itself.122 Under these cir-
cumstances, one's constitutional rights might be infringed upon to
an extent that would never be acceptable under normal condi-
tions.1 23 Consequently, in every instance in which passport meas-
ures were prepared for purposes of war and emergency, such
measures were expressly designed to be discontinued once peace
had ensued. 1
24
The State Department did not easily relinquish the greater
control embodied within the war measures.' 25 Nevertheless, when
the exigencies of war dissipated, efforts to extend emergency con-
trols by the State Department were rejected by the Legislature.
26
The House and Senate were unwilling to enact a law which would
allow the State Department to forbid a free man in a free country
from leaving his own country during times of peace. Similarly, in
1958 and 1966, the executive department unsuccessfully sought the
precise power asserted in the Agee case. 2 7 In 1958, the Senate re-
fused to even consider the State Department's draft bill which
would have authorized the denial of passports to persons whose
travel would "seriously impair the conduct of the foreign relations
of the United States" or be "inimical" to its security. 28 In 1966, the
State Department again sought to enact a passport provision which
would have authorized the Secretary to deny a passport on the
grounds "that the applicant's activities abroad are causing or are
121. See 6 Fed. Reg. 5821 (1941); Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414,
§ 215, 66 Stat. 190 (1952); 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1964); Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 681
(1938).
122. See generaly Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
Korematser v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Korematser].
123. Korematser, 323 U.S. at 218.
124. Brief for Respondent, supra note 92, at 74-77, 95-96.
125. See H.R. REP. No. 9782, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); 58 CONG. REC. 7301 (1919).
126. See H.R. REP. No. 9782, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); 58 CONG. REC. 7301 (1919).
127. Passport Legislation" Hearings on S 2770, S. 3998, S. 4110, S. 4137 Before the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1958); Denial of Passports to Persons
Knowingly Engaged in Activities Intended to Further the International Communist Movement
Hearings on HR 13760 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958); Proposed Travel Controls: Hearings on S, 3243 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
128. Passport Legislation: Hearings on S. 2770, S, 3998, S. 4110, S. 4137 Before the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
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likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign
policy of the United States."'' 29 Yet these proposals were not en-
acted. Ultimately, more than fifty similar passport bills were intro-
duced in Congress between 1958 and 1963, of which none were
passed. 3° The State Department's persistence in the area of pass-
port regulation during this period is in itself indicative that the De-
partment did not feel travel could be restricted for purposes of
national security and foreign policy.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
In previous decisions,131 the Supreme Court never reached the
constitutional issues concerning the right to travel abroad because
the challenged regulations affecting this right were held to be inva-
lid. In the present case, however, after declaring the regulations at
issue valid, the Court attempted a rash and ambiguous treatment of
the constitutional issues before them. The Court merely stated that
the right of international travel is nothing more than an aspect of
the liberty protected by the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. 32 Therefore, one's right to travel can be regulated within the
standards of due process. 
33
A. The Role of the First Amendment
The analysis above indicated that the Agee Court failed to rec-
ognize that first amendment rights might be interrelated with travel
abroad. In previous cases, 13 4 however, the Supreme Court alluded
to the proposition that first amendment rights were associated with
this right. Kent suggested that the first amendment was at least pe-
ripheral to international travel. 31 "Travel abroad, like travel
within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or
wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of
values." 136 Thus, although the Kent Court indicated that the right
to travel abroad was generally protected by the fifth amendment,
129. H.R. 14895, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
130. Ehrlich, supra note 93, at 141.
131. Bauer, 106 F. Supp. 445; Shachtman, 255 F.2d 938; Kent, 357 U.S. 116.
132. Agee, 453 U.S. at 307.
133. Id.
134. Kent, 357 U.S. 116; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Aptheker]; Zemel, 381 U.S. 1; Califano, 439 U.S. 170.
135. Kent, 357 U.S. at 129.
136. Id. at 126.
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the Court also recognized that first amendment rights might be in-
fringed upon when such travel is restricted.
The underlying constitutional issues were developed in
Aptheker v. Secretary of State.1  The appellants, ranking members
of the Communist party, had their passports revoked under section
6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.138 This statute
provided in part that "[wihen a Communist organization is regis-
tered or there is in effect a final order requiring such organization to
register, it shall be unlawful for any member of such organization
to make application for a passport, or to use or attempt to use any
such passport."'' 39 Essentially, the act provided a similar method
for denial of passports on the basis of political associations or be-
liefs as was found in Kent. The distinguishing factor was that in
Aptheker, passports were denied on a statutory basis rather than
pursuant to State Department regulations. The appellants attacked
section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, alleging that the
section was unconstitutional as a deprivation to travel abroad in
violation of the fifth amendment."4 On the basis of Kent, the
Court assumed the existence of the right to travel abroad and de-
clared section 6 to be "unconstitutional on its face," in that it
"sweeps too widely and too indiscriminantly across the liberty
guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment."''
In Aptheker, Justice Goldberg stated that the right to travel
abroad is an aspect of a citizen's liberty guaranteed by the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment. 4 2 Nevertheless, the Court em-
phasized that this right is a "constitutional liberty closely related to
the rights of free speech and association."' 14 3 The constitutionality
of the restrictions imposed by the statute was then tested according
to standards developed in prior decisions concerning infringements
of the freedom of association guaranteed by the first amendment. 144
Commentators on the Aptheker decision have interpreted its
reasoning in two different ways. The first interpretation is that the
right to travel is a fifth amendment right which must be given a
137. Aptheker, 378 U.S. 500.
138. Id.
139. Internal Security Act § 6, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1976).
140. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 503-04.
141. Id. at 514.
142. Id. at 508.
143. Id. at 517.
144. Id. at 516-17. Justice Goldberg relied on NAAC v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) and
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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preferred status because it is closely connected to rights protected
under the first amendment.' 45 In this context, the right to interna-
tional travel is viewed as a personal right necessarily entitled to the
protection afforded the rights of expression and association under
the first amendment. 46 Any restrictions on travel are therefore
subjected to a more stringent standard of review. The "compelling
governmental interest" test rather than the "rationally related" test
would be utilized.
47
This view is supported by the Aptheker opinion itself, wherein
Justice Goldberg referred to travel as a fifth amendment right. 48 It
was then determined that the restriction was violative of substan-
tive due process through the use of first amendment decisions.
149
The acceptance of this interpretation "would establish a standard
of protection under the Fifth Amendment for the right to travel
abroad beyond the rule of reasonableness normally required by
substantive due process."'
' 50
The second and more widely accepted interpretation of the
majority opinion inAptheker was that the Court merely recognized
first amendment rights are related to the right to travel in specific
situations, and that international travel would only be treated as a
preferred right in those instances.' 5 1 International travel would not
be given preferred status "on account of the infringement of the
travel right itself, but rather because some other fundamental con-
stitutional right has been invaded."' 52 Under this interpretation,
first amendment standards of review would be appropriate because
the Aptheker decision actually involved freedom of association.
The latter interpretation was reinforced by subsequent cases.
In Zemel, the Court expressly rejected the argument that the travel
ban constituted a violation of the traveler's first amendment
145. L. Turner, The Right to Travel and the Problem of Unenumerated Constitutional
Rights 182 (1972) (unpublished dissertation available in the University of California at Los
Angeles Library).
146. Comment, supra note 37, at 880.
147. Under the "rationally related" test, the travel regulation merely has to be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental goal. In contrast, the "compelling governmental inter-
est" test requires the court to balance the infringement on a person's constitutional rights
against the asserted governmental interest. The regulation would be held constitutionally
valid only if the interest asserted on the part of the government outweighs the infringement.
148. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 505, 508, 514.
149. Id. at 516-17.
150. Note, The Right To TravelAbroad, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 838, 842 (1974).
151. L. Turner, supra note 145, at 182.
152. Id.
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rights. 15 3 While conceding that the travel ban inhibited the flow of
information concerning Cuba, which was a factor to be considered
in determining whether the travel ban denied the individual of his
substantive due process rights, the Court was not persuaded that a
first amendment right was involved.' 54 The Court stated, "to the
extent the Secretary of State's refusal to validate passports for
travel to Cuba acted as an inhibition, it constituted only an inhibi-
tion of action."' 55 It was emphasized that the argument raised in
Aptheker differed from that presented in the instant case.' 5 6 First,
the passport refusal did not result from any expression or associa-
tion on the part of the applicant. 57 Second, the passport applicant
was not "being forced to choose between membership in an organi-
zation and freedom to travel."'5 8 As a result, the Zemel Court
found that the passport refusal did not involve any first amendment
rights and therefore considered first amendment standards of re-
view inappropriate. The decision indicates, however, that had the
passport restriction infringed on any recognizable first amendment
rights, the restriction would have been substantively reviewed
under a first amendment test.
Califano v. Aznavorian 159 also lends support to the proposition
that the right to travel abroad is not, in itself, a first amendment
right. The appellant alleged that a provision of the Social Security
Act depriving Supplemental Security Income recipients of benefits
during months spent entirely outside the United States resulted in a
denial of the right of international travel as guaranteed by the fifth
amendment."6 Although concluding that the constitutionality of
the statute could be determined by applying the "rationally re-
lated" test, the Court was careful to point out that the instant stat-
ute did "not have nearly so direct an impact on the freedom to
travel internationally as occurred in the Kent, Aptheker, or Zemel
cases." '6' Since the Social Security Act did not "limit the right to
travel on grounds that may be in tension with the First Amend-






159. Califano, 439 U.S. 170.
160. This section provides that "no individual shall be considered an eligible individual
for purposes of this subchapter for any month during all of which such individual is outside
the United States .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1382(0.
161. Califano, 439 U.S. at 177.
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ment," the provision need only be rationally based.' 62 The Court
thus suggested that a statutory travel restriction "in tension" with
first amendment rights might be subject to a higher standard of
scrutiny than the rational basis test.
B. A Proposed Standardfor Judicial Review
It is submitted that the Agee Court should have applied the
method of review outlined by the second interpretation of
Aptheker. This would assure a first amendment standard of review
in any case where the passport applicant or holder is being denied
the right to travel on the basis of his communicative activities or
associations. Inherent within this interpretation is the premise that
there are reasons for travel that have no relationship to free speech
concepts.' 63 Arguably, travel or conduct always involves freedom
of speech. Some courts have provided, however, that travel may be
merely a process enabling someone to be physically present in a
certain place, rather than an exercise of speech or thought."6 As
such, travel can be distinguished from free speech as a means to the
end of enjoying first amendment rights rather than such exercise
itself. In those circumstances, where travel can be detached from
free speech and association, first amendment standards of passport
review would not be applicable.
65
On the other hand, many situations arise whereby the fifth
amendment liberty interest in travel is necessarily commingled with
the first amendment. This was definitely the situation involved in
Agee. Although the Court took the position that the right to travel
is a personal liberty guaranteed by the fifth amendment, it is be-
yond question that in this specific situation, restraint on interna-
tional travel was in conflict with Agee's first amendment rights.
The revocation of Agee's passport was intended to deter him from
criticizing American foreign policy and intelligence activities. Agee
was therefore prevented from exercising his right to engage in polit-
ical speech,66 and the Court should have made it clear that the first
162. Id.
163. See MacEwan v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 963 (3rd
Cir. 1965).
164. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16.
165. "Travel for reasons of health, for purely commercial purposes, and for pleasure are
not ideological concepts." Comment, Executive Restriction on Travel: 'The Passport Cases, 5
Hous. L. REV. 499, 506 (1968).
166. Tribe has expressed the opinion that a court should subject any governmental act to
more demanding scrutiny, whether taken by the Legislature' or the Executive, which is in-
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amendment "compelling governmental interest" test was
applicable.
This analysis is further supported by Kent and Aptheker,
where the Court also dealt with first amendment confficts. In both
cases, the applicant's passports had been denied on the basis of
their exercise of first amendment rights. The Court held that one
cannot be forced to exchange the right of freedom of speech and
association for the privilege to travel abroad.'67 In effect, this is
what again occurred in Agee. If Agee were to relinquish his first
amendment right to criticize government policy, there would be no
need for him to forego his right to travel internationally.
In review, the suggested approach would not entirely prohibit
the State Department from denying passports to travelers; it would
apply a more rigorous standard of review, thereby preventing the
government from restricting travel abroad merely to prevent criti-
cism of its policies. Imminent, rather than potential, harm to the
national security or foreign policy would be required before one's
passport could be denied. "For if the constitutional guarantee
means anything, it means that, ordinarily at least, 'the government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content.' ",168
VII. CONCLUSION
Until recently, the right to travel internationally had never
been seriously questioned. Travel restrictions were imposed only
on the basis of criminal activities or absence of allegiance to the
United States. With the advent of State Department regulations
governing the right to a passport, the courts were asked to promul-
gate standards to determine when this right could be denied. The
result was the imposition of the requirement that the Executive
demonstrate that it had denied passports consistently on a similar
basis before it could deny a passport in the instant case. It is unfor-
tunate that the Agee decision has departed from this test and now
only requires a longstanding policy.
Equally unfortunate is the fact that the Court ignored the in-
fringement upon Agee's first amendment rights. Since Agee's activ-
tended by the government actor to control or penalize the exercise of rights of expression or
association. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 580-88, 591-94.
167. Kent, 357 U.S. at 130; Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 507.
168. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 581 (quoting Police Department of the City of Chicago v.
Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
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ities had already caused damage to the national security, the Court
had no difficulty in upholding the passport revocation. This deci-
sion, however, will enable the Secretary of State to deny issuance of
passports to any applicant whose activity abroad might be ques-
tionable. As this Note suggests, restrictions on the right to travel
internationally, under circumstances like those in Agee, invade
both first and fifth Amendment constitutional rights of the traveler.
Consequently, the courts should employ more stringent standards
for determining the validity of passport restrictions.
Dale A McBride
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